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The perspective matters! Multisensory integration in ego-
centric reference frames determines full-body ownership
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Recent advances in experimental science have made it possible to investigate the perceptual 
processes involved in generating a sense of owning an entire body.  This is achieved by full-body 
ownership illusions which make use of specific patterns of visual and somatic stimuli integration. 
Here we investigate the fundamental question of the reference frames used in the process of 
attributing an entire body to the self. We quantified the strength of the body-swap illusion in 
conditions where the participants were observing this artificial body from the perspective of 
the first or third person. Consistent results from subjective reports and physiological recordings 
show that the first person visual perspective is critical for the induction of this full-body ownership 
illusion. This demonstrates that the multisensory integration processes producing the sense 
of corporeal self operates in an ego-centric reference frame.
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Ehrsson, 2008). This findings suggest at the core of this perceptual 
phenomenon is the integration of multiple sources of sensory infor-
mation centered on the spatial location of the “new” body (Petkova 
and Ehrsson, 2008).
Still unanswered, however, is the important question of the role 
played by the visual perspective in the process of perceiving an 
entire body as one’s own. In spatial cognition research, a basic 
distinction is made between the first person perspective (1PP) 
and the third person perspective (3PP; Vogeley and Fink, 2003), 
related to ego-centric and allocentric reference frames, respectively 
(Klatzky, 1998; Burgess, 2006). An ego-centric reference frame is 
a coordinate system centered on the body, and is considered to be 
important for functions related to perception and to performing 
actions (Fogassi et al., 1992; Graziano and Gross, 1998). In contrast, 
the allocentric reference frame corresponds to world coordinates 
centered on a reference point in extrapersonal space. This coordi-
nate system is considered important for spatial cognitive functions 
such as determining one’s location with respect to environmental 
landmarks, spatial navigation, and spatial memory (Maguire et al., 
1998; Burgess, 2006).
The uncertainty about the role played by the visual perspective 
in feeling ownership of a body arises both from experimental results 
from full-body illusions in healthy individuals (see below) and 
from certain neurological conditions which suggest that the relation 
between self-awareness and the first person visual perspective is 
not straightforward. For example, in evoked or spontaneous cases 
of autoscopy, a form of out-of-body experience in which people 
perceive themselves as being outside their own body looking at it 
from an altered egocentric perspective, people still report that the 
body they observe is their own, thus, they demonstrate intact body 
self-attribution, despite the fact that they are viewing the body from 
a 3PP (Blanke et al., 2002, 2004; Blanke and Mohr, 2005).
IntroductIon
How do we come to experience our body as part of ourselves? Does 
the mind have the capacity to attribute an entire new body to the 
self? These questions are fundamental to our understanding of the 
relationship between the body, the mind, and the sense of self (James, 
1890; Gallagher, 2000; Metzinger, 2003; Merleau-Ponty, 2005).
Recent advances in experimental science have made it possible 
for cognitive neuroscientists to address this important aspect of 
self-awareness in controlled laboratory settings (Botvinick and 
Cohen, 1998; Jeannerod, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Makin et al., 
2008; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2010). One 
particularly powerful approach is the use of “full-body illusions” 
in which healthy individuals experience a new artificial body as 
their own (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and 
Ehrsson, 2008; Slater et al., 2009). This approach follows a long 
tradition in psychology and neuroscience of studying perceptual 
illusions to learn more about the basic processes that underlie nor-
mal perception. In one such full-body illusion, the “body-swap 
illusion” (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008), the participants are able 
to sense the touches applied to the body of a shop mannequin 
and experience this body as their own. This illusion is elicited in 
the following way: the participants observe the artificial body via 
head-mounted displays (HMD) connected to video-cameras placed 
on the mannequin’s head. The cameras are positioned so that they 
look down at the mannequin’s body, and thus, the participants see 
the mannequin’s body at the location where they would normally 
see their own body. The illusion is evoked when the experimenter 
applies identical synchronous touches to the body of the man-
nequin and the participant’s body. The illusion is abolished, or 
significantly reduced, if the human body is replaced with an object 
that does not have a humanoid shape (e.g., a block of wood) or if 
asynchronous touches are applied to the two bodies (Petkova and Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognition    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 35  |  2
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a full size shop mannequin (mannequin #1). The platform upon 
which the CCTV cameras were mounted was fixed on a rotating 
axis, which allowed the cameras to be pointed either downward to 
the body of the mannequin (mannequin #1), or forward toward 
the body of second identical mannequin (mannequin #2) placed 
opposite mannequin #1 at a distance of 75 cm from the participant 
(Figure 1). Thus, the participants could not see their own body but 
only the body of mannequin #1 or #2 from one or other of the two 
different points of view (see further below).
The experiment consisted of two conditions, each of which 
lasted for 2 min. The order of the conditions was balanced across 
the participants. In the condition corresponding to the 1PP, the 
participant was asked to tilt his head downward as if to look at his 
own body while actually looking through the HMDs at the body 
of mannequin #1 at a location and orientation similar to the par-
ticipant’s own body. In the second condition, referred to as the 3PP 
condition, the participant was asked to position his head as if to look 
forward toward the body of a person standing just opposite him. In 
the HMDs, the participant saw the body of mannequin #2 facing 
him at a distance of 75 cm. In both conditions the experimenter 
used two plastic rods to apply the same number of synchronized 
strokes on the right lateral parts of the mannequin’s abdomen and 
the participant’s abdomen. After each condition, the participants 
were asked to complete a questionnaire, in which they had to affirm 
or deny nine possible perceptual effects using a seven-point Likert 
scale (Figure 3A).
More directly relevant for the question of how a normally func-
tioning mind creates a multisensory experience of one’s own body, 
as is under consideration here, is the fact that two principally dif-
ferent experimental set-ups have been used to induce “full-body 
illusions” associated with changes in perceived body ownership 
in healthy participants (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and 
Ehrsson, 2008). In these experiments, synchronous visual and tac-
tile stimulation is always applied both to the artificial body in sight 
of the participant and the participant’s own body which is out of 
sight. However, the illusory “own” body is either viewed from a 
3PP, as though looking at another individual a couple of meters in 
front of oneself (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009; Aspell et al., 2009), 
or from a 1PP (Ehrsson, 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Slater 
et al., 2009, 2010), as though directly looking down at one’s body. 
Logically, if the visual perspective is irrelevant, one would anticipate 
that the body ownership illusion would be evoked equally well in 
these two situations. Hence, some authors have concluded that body 
ownership would depend solely on the detection of visuo-tactile 
synchrony (Meyer et al., 2008).
Here, we sought to address this important question and to 
investigate which of the two basic visual perspectives is most 
important for the perceptual illusion of owning an entire artificial 
body and, therefore, for the general mechanisms of attributing a 
body to oneself. In two different behavioral set-ups, we directly 
compared  experimental  conditions  in  which  the  participants 
observed a body of a mannequin from either the first or the third 
person visual perspective. We hypothesized that the first person 
visual perspective would represent a fundamental constraint on 
the full-body illusion. This would be in line with the proposed 
model that the sense of body ownership relies on multisensory 
integration mechanisms operating in body-part-centered refer-
ence frames (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Makin et al., 2008; Petkova and 
Ehrsson, 2008; Ehrsson, 2011).
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
A total of 50 naive healthy participants were recruited to the study, 
comprised of three separate behavioral experiments. In the first 
behavioral experiment, we tested a group of 20 male participants 
(mean age and SD: 24 ± 5 years), in the second 13 male volunteers 
were included (mean age and SD: 27 ± 4 years), and in the third, 17 
male participants were recruited (mean age and SD: 24 ± 4 years). 
All participants were male to exclude possible confounding effect 
of gender as both mannequins used in the experiment were male. 
The Ethical Review Board of Karolinska Institutet approved the 
experimental protocol and written informed consent was obtained 
from each participant.
exPerIMental Procedures
Experiment #1
During  the  experiment,  participants  wore  a  set  of  HMDs 
(Cybermind Visette Pro PAL, Cybermind Interactive, Maastricht, 
the  Netherlands)  with  a  wide  field-of-view  (diagonal  field-of-
view = 71.5°; following the procedures described in Petkova and 
Ehrsson, 2008). These HMDs were connected to two synchronized 
color CCTV cameras (Protos IV, Vista, Wokingham, Berkshire, UK) 
attached side-by-side to a special platform mounted on the head of 
Figure 1 | experimental set-up in experiments #1 and #2. (A) Set-up used 
to create the full-body illusion when the mannequin’s body is perceived from 
the first person perspective. (B,C) Depict what the participants see when they 
observe the touches or the knife-induced threats in the first person 
perspective condition. (D) Set-up designed to probe the full-body illusion 
when the mannequin’s body is perceived from the third person perspective. 
(e,F) Depict the participants’ perspective when they received touches or knife 
threats in the condition presented from the third person perspective.www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 35  |  3
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direction 1 m to the right of the participant’s bed (Figures 2D–F). 
The participant was asked to turn his head to the right and look 
at the body of mannequin #2 on the other bed. A curtain was 
positioned over the body of mannequin #1 resting on top of the 
participant’s body (see previous paragraph) to hide it from the 
participant. The curtain was also occluding the experimenter, who 
applied synchronous (3PP sync) or asynchronous (3PP async) 
touches on the right lateral part of the abdomens of the participant 
and mannequin #2. We used an identical threat-procedure to that 
when “cutting” the mannequin with a knife, as described above, and 
registered the associated SCRs. The four conditions (1PP Sync, 1PP 
Async, 3PP Sync, and 3PP Async) were repeated three times in an 
order that was balanced over all the participants.
results
exPerIMents 1 and 2: elIcItatIon of the IllusIon usIng head-
Mounted dIsPlays and vIdeo-technology
We first examined the role of the visual perspective (first vs. third 
person) for the elicitation of the full-body illusion by using a 
modified version of our previously published “body-swap illusion” 
(Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; see Materials and Methods). In the 
first experiment, we used a questionnaire to quantify the subjec-
tive experience of the two experimental conditions in a group of 
20 naïve participants. The results showed that 17 out of the 20 
participants perceived that the mannequin’s body was their own 
body when viewed from the 1PP. In contrast, only seven out of 
20 affirmed this experience when they viewed the body from the 
third person visual perspective (Figure 3A). Importantly, in the 1PP 
condition, the mean rating scores for the three illusion questions 
were greater than for the six control questions, and this difference 
was greater than in the 3PP condition. Thus, there were significant 
differences between the levels of the factors “Perspective” [first vs. 
Experiment #2
The experimental set-up and general procedures were identical 
to those used in the first experiment, but instead of using a ques-
tionnaire to probe for subjective illusion-related experiences, we 
used a knife to inflict injury on the mannequin, while registering 
the skin conductance responses (SCR) of the participants. The 
threat-evoked SCR is related to autonomic nervous system arousal 
when the own body is physically threatened and can be used as an 
objective index of the illusion (as described in detail in Petkova 
and Ehrsson, 2008). The experiment consisted of four conditions, 
repeated three times in a pseudo-randomized order. In two condi-
tions the body of the mannequin was seen from the 1PP and the 
timing of the visuo-tactile stimulus was either synchronized (1PP 
sync) or asynchronized (1PP async). In the two other conditions the 
body was seen from the 3PP (3PP sync vs. 3PP async). Each condi-
tion lasted 1 min and was immediately followed by a “threat event” 
during which the experimenter was perceived to cut with a knife 
the abdomen of the mannequin being looked at. The knife was slid 
along the mannequin’s abdomen, and the motion was performed 
so that the knife was always moved along the horizontal axis from 
left to right in the field-of-view of the HMDs (the whole event took 
approximately 3 s). The onsets of these threat events were flagged 
in the computer files recording the SCRs, and the magnitude of 
the related conductance changes was calculated according to the 
procedures described in Petkova and Ehrsson (2008).
Experiment #3
Here, we created a new set-up that allowed the participants to expe-
rience the illusion of owning the mannequin’s body without the use 
of HMDs and video-cameras. The set-up used for the first person 
visual perspective conditions was as follows: the participant was 
asked to lay on a bed tilted at 30° from the horizontal. The front 
half of the body of a shop mannequin was positioned on top of the 
participant so that the shoulders of the mannequin were resting 
on the shoulders of the participant and the feet of the mannequin 
were resting on a horizontal support positioned ∼50 cm above the 
feet of the participant. Thus, when the participant looked down 
as if to look at his body, he saw the body of the mannequin in a 
similar position to where he would expect his own body to be had he 
been to lying down horizontally (Figures 2A–C). The experimenter 
used two plastic rods to apply touches on the right lateral part of 
the abdomens of the mannequin and the participant, either in a 
synchronous manner (1PP Sync) or in an asynchronous mode (1PP 
Async). While this was going on, the experimenter was out of sight, 
hidden behind a curtain, to prevent the participants from seeing 
the experimenter’s hand touching the participant’s own abdomen. 
Thus, the only hand the participant saw was the experimenter’s 
hand touching the abdomen of the mannequin. After 1 min of 
synchronous or asynchronous tactile stimulation, the experimenter 
used a knife to “cut” the mannequin’s abdomen in a single move-
ment lasting approximately 3 s. The SCRs associated with these 
threat events were registered and analyzed as explained above and 
in the previously published protocols (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008).
The set-up used to test the illusion when the mannequin was 
viewed from a 3PP was as follows: Mannequin #2 was placed on an 
identical bed as the one the participant was lying on. This bed was 
tilted at the same angle (approx 30°), but turned in the opposite 
Figure 2 | experimental set-up developed to induce the body-swap 
illusion without head-mounted displays and video-technology 
(experiment #3). (A–C) The experimental set-up and the participant’s field of 
sight in the conditions in which the mannequin’s body was viewed directly 
from the first person perspective. (D–F) The set-up developed to probe the 
full-body illusion when the mannequin’s body was perceived from the third 
person perspective.Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognition    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 35  |  4
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significance F(1,12) = 2.761, p = 0.122, however the levels of the fac-
tor “Timing” were significantly different F(1,12) = 5.160, p = 0.042 
(Figure 3B). Direct pairwise comparisons of the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions reached significance only when the man-
nequin was observed from the 1PP (p = 0.017; see Figure 1B). Thus, 
both the physiological and the questionnaire data showed that the 
first person visual perspective is an important factor for attributing 
the body of a mannequin to one’s self.
exPerIMent 3: elIcItIng the IllusIon wIthout usIng head-
Mounted dIsPlays and vIdeo-technology
Next, we reproduced our findings in a real life set-up and excluded 
the possibility that the illusion depends on the video-technology 
used. For this, we devised an experimental set-up in which the body 
of the mannequin could be observed directly, either from the 1PP or 
from the 3PP (Figure 2). In a new group of 17 naïve volunteers, we 
made use of the threat-evoked SCRs to quantify the illusion objec-
tively. As expected, we observed significantly greater threat-evoked 
responses in the condition when the body was observed from the 
1PP and the touches on the two bodies were synchronized (a sig-
nificant interaction between the main factors “Perspective” (first vs. 
third) and “Timing of visual and tactile stimulation” [synchronous 
vs. asynchronous; F(1,16) = 4.727, p = 0.045, two-way ANOVA]. 
third; F(1, 19) = 5.787, p = 0.026], and “Question type” [illusion vs. 
control; F(1,19) = 111.914, p < 0.001] and, crucially, a significant 
interaction between the two factors [F(1,19) = 10.226, p = 0.005] 
in two-way 2 × 2 ANOVA.
Objective evidence for this effect was obtained in a second 
experiment using a different group of 13 naïve participants. Here, 
we first induced the illusion using the procedures described above 
and then “physically threatened” the mannequin by moving a knife 
along the abdomen of the mannequin’s body. We then measured 
the resulting changes of the SCRs. To control for the unspecific 
effect of seeing a knife, we used a 2 × 2 factorial design where we 
systematically varied the visual perspective and the synchronicity 
of the applied touches to the mannequin’s and the participant’s 
bodies because asynchronous touches on the two bodies have been 
shown to eliminate or significantly reduce the illusion (Petkova 
and Ehrsson, 2008). We found that the threat-evoked physiological 
reaction was significantly greater in the condition with synchronous 
touches when the mannequin was observed from the 1PP than 
when it was seen from the 3PP. Statistically, this corresponded to 
a significant interaction between the main factors “Perspective” 
(first vs. third) and “Timing of the visual and tactile stimuli” [syn-
chronous vs. asynchronous; F(1,12) = 6.876, p = 0.022, two-way 
ANOVA]. The main effect of the factor “Perspective” did not reach 
Figure 3 | introspective and objective evidences from the three 
experiments. (A) Experiment #1: The participants rated the illusion-related 
questions significantly higher than the control questions; this difference was 
significantly greater when the mannequin’s body was perceived from the first 
person perspective (i.e., significant interaction of the main factors “Perspective” 
vs. “Question type”). Dark bars represent the ratings in the first person 
perspective and light bars represent the ratings in the third person perspective 
respectively. The error bars indicate standard errors. (B) Experiment #2: The 
threat-evoked increase in the skin conductance responses (SCR) was significant 
only in the condition in which the participant observed the synchronized 
visuo-tactile stimulation from the first person perspective. The error bars indicate 
standard errors. (C) Experiment #3: The full-body illusion can be evoked without 
the help of HMDs and video-technology. The specific threat-evoked increase in 
the SCR when the body was observed from the first person perspective again 
emphasizes the importance of this visual perspective for the mechanism of 
attributing a body to oneself. The error bars indicate standard errors.www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 35  |  5
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a consciously experienced body (face) illusion, as evident from 
the rather low questionnaire rating scores when potential illusory 
experiences were probed (Sforza et al., 2010).
Another study employed a similar set-up to induce an out-of-
body illusion (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). In this experiment, the 
participants were looking either at their own body or the body of 
a mannequin, dressed in the same way as the participant, projected 
2 m in front of them via the video-technology. According to the 
questionnaire data, the participants reported a self-attribution of 
the seen (own vs. mannequin’s) body only when the visuo-tactile 
stimulation was synchronized. However, it cannot be excluded that 
these affirmative ratings were simply the result of visual self-rec-
ognition processes in which the participant understood the spatial 
cognitive transformation of the set-up (i.e., that he/she was cogni-
zant of being filmed from behind and of this image being projected 
in front of him/her). Thus, it is plausible that the participants in 
this experiment recognized the virtual body they saw as a visual 
representation of their own body, without necessarily experiencing 
a somatic illusion of ownership in the same way as in the rubber 
hand illusion or in the body-swap illusion described here and in 
Petkova and Ehrsson (2008). The key difference is that the illusion 
presented here involves a complete perceptual binding of visual, 
tactile, and proprioceptive information onto the mannequin’s body, 
which is experienced, somatically, to be one’s own body. According 
to the results presented here, when observing a mannequin in far 
extrapersonal space from a 3PP, as in the study by Lenggenhager 
et al. (2007), a somatic illusion of this kind is absent, or at least 
significantly weaker. In the first two experiments, reported here, 
where the participants were wearing the HMDs, we observed weak 
affirmative rating scores for the statement that the mannequin body 
was one’s own also in the third person visual perspective condition 
with synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation (Figure 3A). However, 
the ratings scores were significantly lower in comparison to the 
condition where the 1PP was adopted and there were no significant 
changes in the threat-evoked SCRs (see Figures 3B,C). Thus, we 
interpreted this effect as a form of general self-recognition rather 
than a genuine body illusion. This conclusion would be consistent 
with our experience from pilot experiments (see also Ehrsson and 
Petkova’s response to Meyer et al., 2008) that this “self-recognition” 
effect completely disappears if one tries to induce the illusion from 
a 3PP without HMDs. This is in stark contrast to the body-swap 
illusion, which can be elicited without the use of video-technology, 
as we have demonstrated here.
A careful reader might have noted that the 3PP condition in the 
experiments reported here differed from the 1PP condition both 
in terms of perspective as such, and in that the mannequin was 
observed in far extrapersonal space rather than in peripersonal 
space. Thus, in principle, both these factors could have contributed 
to the abolishment of the illusion observed in the 3PP conditions. 
When designing the experiments we found it very unlikely that the 
significant reduction in the strength of the illusion in the 3PP condi-
tion could simply be due to the fact the mannequin was positioned 
in the far extrapersonal space. Research in the rubber hand illusion 
has shown that rotations of the model hand so that it is no longer 
matches the posture of the hidden real hand eliminates the illusion 
even when the rubber hand is positioned in the peripersonal space 
(Pavani et al., 2000; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; 
There were significant differences between the levels of the fac-
tors “Perspective” [F(1, 16) = 12.195, p = 0.003], and “Timing” 
[F(1,16) = 48.963, p < 0.001; Figure 3C]. The pairwise compari-
sons of the synchronous and asynchronous conditions were only 
significant when the 1PP was adopted (p < 0.01; Figure 1C). Thus, 
the illusion could be induced without the help of HMDs, but only 
when the mannequin was viewed from the 1PP.
dIscussIon
Here, we have investigated the role played by the visual perspec-
tive in the mechanism underlying the self-attribution of an entire 
artificial body. Our results demonstrated that the first person visual 
perspective is critical for triggering the illusion of full-body owner-
ship. This is an important observation as it shows that the very basic 
sensation of owning one’s body is the result of a constructive process 
where visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals are integrated in 
ego-centric coordinates.
These findings are relevant for the formulation of general mod-
els of body ownership (Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris, 2010; Ehrsson, 
2011) and corroborate models that emphasize that multisensory 
integration in body-part-centered reference frames is a crucial 
mechanism for the self-attribution of limbs as well as entire bod-
ies (Makin et al., 2008; Ehrsson, 2011). The results of the present 
study, together with those from a previous report from our lab 
(Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008), show that the illusion of perceiving 
an entire body as belonging to oneself depends on: (i) temporal 
congruency of the visual and tactile signals applied in peripersonal 
space (i.e., within reaching distance); (ii) the “new” body having a 
sufficiently humanoid body shape; and (iii) using the first person 
visual perspective. The same constraints apply to the experience of 
the rubber hand illusion, which is an experimental model to study 
the self-attribution of a single body limb (Botvinick and Cohen, 
1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini 
and Haggard, 2007; Lloyd, 2007; Tsakiris, 2010). Thus, it is likely 
that both phenomena rely on similar multisensory mechanisms. 
In this multisensory framework, the integration of temporally, and 
spatially congruent visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals gen-
erates a perceptually coherent percept of one’s own body (Makin 
et al., 2008; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Ehrsson, 2011).
Our results help resolve a recent discussion in the literature 
about the role played by the visual perspective in full-body illusions 
(Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Meyer et al., 2008). It also 
corroborates the interpretation that the present illusion is a genuine 
body ownership illusion and not merely a more general form of 
self-recognition, as is the case when recognizing oneself in a mirror 
or on a CCTV screen. However, the question of how one can accom-
modate the conceptual differences between the results presented 
here and the findings reported by other groups (Lenggenhager et al., 
2007); see also the set-up used in (Tsakiris, 2008) and (Sforza et al., 
2010) which utilize the 3PP to trigger a body ownership illusion 
remains to be determined. For example, in the “enfacement effect” 
(Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010), people show a self-bias on visual 
face recognition tasks after a period of looking at the face of another 
person sitting opposite themselves while synchronous touches are 
applied to both this face and their own. However, in these experi-
ments the face of the other person was viewed from a 3PP, which 
is consistent with the fact that this effect was not associated with Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognition    March 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 35  |  6
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